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IL THE TERMINATION OF POWERS BY THE DONEE
Powers are terminated when the period has expired within
which, by the terms of their creation, they are to be exercised.,
As they are usually personal to the donee, they will generally
terminate on his death; though, of course, the donor may stip-
ulate for their termination before that time. A power may also
be terminated when it has been exercised, and to the extent that
it has been exercised.2 But the kind of termination herein con-
sidered is a termination caused by the act of the donee independ-
ent of the intent of the donor and before the time provided
for the expiration of the power. Our question is tlds: Under
what circumstances may the donee of a power extinguish it and
thus be precluded from subsequently exercising it? In the dis-
cussion of this problem, no attempt will be made to analyse the
English decisions as a whole. The purpose of this paper is to
suggest a rational explanation of the American cases on the
subject.
At the outset we must recognize that the problem of the ex-
tinguishing of a power is in some respects unique in the law.
It bears a resemblance to the disclaimer of a trustee or executor.
But it is not disclaimer, for a trustee or executor cannot dis-
claim as to a part, yet the donee of a power, when he may ex-
tinguish it at all, may effectuate a partial extinguishment.4 Nor
*Continued from the November issue, 37 YALE LAw JOUnf.AL 63.
1 See ROOD, WILLS (2d ed. 1926) § 759; FARWIVE, POWErS (3d ed. 1916)
39. See also, Ryan v. Daly, 134 Atl. 546 (N. J. Eq. 1926).
2 A power of sale or a power of appointment would ordinarily terminate
when it was exercised. 1 TFFANY, RuALu PnoPrRy (2d ed. 1920) § 331.
But it is clear that it could be exercised as to different portions of, or in-
terests in, the property at different times. That is, successive acts in
exercise of the power are possible. See FARWELL, op. cit. s'7a note 1, at
43; Jones v. Winwood, 3 M. & W. 653 (1838). But it has been held that
a power to sell and reinvest does not terminate by one sale. Owsley v.
Eads' Trustee, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 355, 57 S. W. 225 (1900).
Such matters would seem to depend on the intent of the creator of the
power.
3 They are discussed in the article by Professor Gray on Relcasc and
Discharge of Powers (1911) 24 HARV. L. REv. 511.
4 See Hill v. Sangamon Loan & Trust Co., 302 II. 3"3, 134 N. E. 112 (1922),
where the court held that the power involved was extinguished as to 7/8
of the property subject to it; Atkinson v. Dowling, 33 S. C. 414, 12 S. E.
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is the extinguishment of a power closely analogous to the con-
veyance of a trust res by a trustee to a bona fide purchaser.
The trustee's act is wrongful and does not relieve him of all duty
with respect to his office; but the donee of a power, 'where he
extinguishes, puts an end to all duties arising with respect to
the power. There is also some similarity to the situation where
an agent terminates the relation existing between himself and
his principal. But in that case the net result is materially
different. When the extinguishment of a power of appointment
occurs, the property is then quite generally out of the control of
the donor and not improbably the donor is dead (for many pow-
ers are not to be exercised until after the donor's death) ; so
that the purpose of the donor in creating the power is likely to
fail irrevocably by reason of the extinguishment. Yet in the case
of an agency, the principal expects the authority to operate dur-
ing his lifetime and under his control; hence, he is more likely
to survive any termination of the agency.
An extended discussion of the extinguishment of powers will
necessitate some use of the terminology employed by Chief Baron
Hale in Edwards v. Sleator,5 in which were distinguished powers
appendant, where the donee has title to or an interest in the
propelty which would be defeated by the exercise of the power;
powers in gross, where the donee has an interest in the property,
usually a life estate, which is not affected by the exercise of the
power; and powers simply collateral, where the donee has no
interest in the property. It will be useful also to distinguish
between beneficial powers, which may be exercised for the bene-
fit of the donee or of his estate; and special powers, which may
be exercised only for the benefit of persons other than the
donee.
The usual analysis of the subject of extinguishment of powers
is briefly as follows: First, as to powers appendant, a convey-
ance of the property by the donee operates to estop him from
subsequently exercising the power to the prejudice of his alienee.
To use the phrase most commonly appearing in the cases, the
donee "cannot derogate from his own grant." Second, as to special
powers purely collateral and special powers in gross, we may
93 (1890), where the power was held to be extinguished as to one lot of
the property subject to it.
S Hardres 410, 415 (1665): "First, powers to raise estates are either
simply collateral (as where a party that has such a power has not, nor ever
had any estate in the land: as where such power is reserved to a stranger,
and there it cannot be destroyed by such stranger, because it is no more
than a bare nomination) or not simply collateral: And these latter are




express the usual viewpoint by quoting the carefully worded
dicta of Sir John Leach in West v. Berneeyr, as follows:
"Upon the authorities and principle my opinion is, that a
power simply collateral, that is, a power to a stranger, who has
no interest in the land, cannot be extinguished or suspended by
any act of his own or others with respect to the land.
I think that every power reserved to a grantee for life, though
not appendant to his own estate, as a leasing power, but to take
effect after the determination of his own estate, and therefore
in gross, may be extinguished. In respect of his freehold inter-
est he can act upon the estate, and his dealing with the estate
so as to create interests inconsistent with the exercise of his
power must extinguish his power. The general principle is, that
it is not permitted to a man to defeat his own grant. Such a
power in gross in a tenant for life would not be defeated by a
conveyance of his life estate, as a power appendant or leasing
power would be defeated; because the conveyance of his life
estate is not inconsistent with the exercise of his power."
In other words, it is said that the real basis for allowing the
extinguishment of a special power in gross is the same as for a
power appendant. For under the old law, a life tenant could,
by fine, feoffment, or common recovery, tortiously convey in fee
simple; and this conveyance, operating as an alienation in fee
simple, prevented the donee from exercising the power, under
the rule that one cannot derogate from his own grant.
That explanation seems satisfactory enough as far as it goes,
but, as its proponents readily perceived, it did not explain all
the cases. The English law, before the statutory modifications
of 1881, was, as stated by Farwell,7 to the effect that "all powers,
other than powers collateral and powers coupled with a trust
or duty might have been . . . suspended or destroyed, either
wholly or in part, by the donees thereof." And as we shall en-
deavor to show, the present American law is to the same effect.
Thus, it is possible to destroy a power in gross, not only by a
tortious conveyance in fee, but also by a release. Since a re-
lease is an innocent conveyance, passing no larger interest than
the releasor has, the argument about derogating from one's
grant is inapplicable. Moreover, today as a rule, it is not pos-
sible for a man to convey a larger legal title than he has; and
furthermore, the doctrine of tortious conveyances never did have
any application to personalty or to equitable interests. Hence,
under modern conditions, the rule that one cannot derogate from
his own grant offers no explanation for the extinguishment of a
special power in gross by the donee.
Thus, the dilemma is presented of explaining why, if a special
power in gross is releasable, a special power purely collateral
6 See 1 Russ. & My. 431, 434, 435 (1819).
FARWELL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 16.
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is not releasable also. Or, if a special power purely collateral
is not releasable, then why should the courts allow the release,
of a special power in gr:oss? Professor Gray and Professor
Kales, in discussing the subject, took the second horn of the
dilemma, and argued that a release of special powers in gross
was illogical.8 But in view of the recent trend of American de-
cisions, that solution is increasingly difficult to sustain. The fol-
lowing is therefore proposed:
Does not the true line of distinction lie between those powers'
which are imperative,-that is, powers in trust,-and those
powers which are optional? If the donor is under a duty to a
group of persons to make an appointment for the benefit of
one or more of the group, it seems unjust to allow him to get
rid of that duty. It is true, one may sometimes decline to as-
sume a duty when it is offered. But as a rule, though he may
release rights and privileges, he cannot rid himself of an active
duty. This is illustrated in the ordinary case of a trusteeship.
Though one may ordinarily refuse to be a trustee, yet, if one has
once assumed the duties, he cannot discharge them by declining
to perform them whenever he feels so disposed.
On the other hand, if the donee of a power is not under an
active duty to exercise it, either absolutely or conditionally,
there seems to be no very good reason why he may not ex-
tinguish the power if he wishes. The donor has intended that
he exercise the power or not, at his option. And if there is
a rule that he may release, it will operate in the interests of
freer alienability of property. It is true he may, by releasing,
defeat the desires of the donor. But can we say that he owes
any duty to the donor as such? While, of course, the whole body
of rules of law concerning powers may be said to be designed
primarily to enable a donor to carry out certain wishes by means
-of powers, yet the law does not carry out those wishes by giving
the donor any right of action against the donee, whether the
power be imperative or not. Hence, if the donee is under no
duty to execute the power, it is believed that he should be per-
mitted to extinguish it.
It has been said that the donee of every special power is a
fiduciary,9 and thus it has been argued that special powers in
gross should not be releasable. It may be conceded that, if the
donee acts, he is under a duty not to exercise the power in-
directly for his own benefit, in other words, not to make an
appointment in fraud of the power.10 But that duty is con-
8 Gray, loc. cit. supra note 3; KALES, FUTURE INTERESTS (2d ed. 1920)
§ 611.
9 Ibid.
10 On appointments in fraud of the power, see in general: SUGDEsN, PoW-
Ens (8th ed. 1861) 606-621; FARWELL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 457-495;
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cededly of a different character from the duty of the donee of a
power in trust. As Sir John Leach observed in Wcst v. Berncy,".
with reference to one of the arguments of counsel:
"Mr. Preston urged the relief given against frauds upon the
power; as in the case of an appointment by a father substantially
to himself. This, however, does not prove the existence of a
trust. It proves only that a power given for a particular pur-
pose shall not by circuity be exercised for a different purpose."
Whether we say the duty not to appoint in fraud of the power
be fiduciary or not,12 the duty is conditioned on the donee's mak-
ing an appointment. It seems that a donee may release a special
power for his own benefit and this will not be regarded as fraud-
ulent.13  Hence the rule which permits the release of some
special powers is not necessarily inconsistent with the rule
against fraudulent appointments.
Let us now consider to what extent the proposition that all
powers are extinguishable except powers in trust is borne out
by the cases, with particular reference to American law.
First, can a power in trust be extinguished? Although the
LEAxE, LAW OF PROPERTY (2d ed. 1909) 311-315; 1 TISFA.xY, op. cit. szipmI
note 2, § 329.
"Supra note 6, at 436.
While the courts sometimes speak of the duty of a donee not to make
an appoininent in fraud of the power as if it were fiduciary, and it has
even been suggested that such a duty was involved by virtue of the exist-
ence of a power in trust (See In re Bradshaw [1902] 1 Ch. 43G, 447), the
better view would seem to be that equity is merely intervening in those
cases to prevent an execution of the power which is, in substance, in ex-
cess of the power conferred. Such appears to have been the view of Lord
St. Leonards, of Farwell and of Tiffany, judging by the citations from
those authors referred to supra note 10. See also the observation of the
court in Vatcher v. Paull [1915] A. C. 372, 378: "The term fraud in con-
nection with frauds on a power does not necessarily denote any conduct
on the part of the appointor amounting to fraud in the common law mean-
ing of the term or any conduct which could properly be termed dishonest or
immoral. It merely means that the power has been exercised for a pur-
pose, or with an intention, beyond the scope of or not justified by the
instrument creating the power."
To the effect that a special power is not necessarily a power in trust
are: In re Somes [1896] 1 Ch. 250; Atkinson v. Dowling, supra note 4.
'3 To that effect are: In re Radcliffe [1892] 1 Ch. 227; In re Soines,
supra note 12; In re Little, 40 Ch. D. 418 (1889). These cases are decided
in part on the English Conveyancing Act of 1881, which made all powers
releasable except powers in trust.
In several American cases it appears that, while the point was not under
discussion, a release or extinguishment of a special power was permitted
where it operated to the benefit of the donee. Cases of that sort are:
Baker v. Wilmert, 288 Ill. 434, 123 N. E. 627 (1919); Hill v. Sangamon
Loan & Trust Co., supra note 4. But compare Thomson's Ex'rs v. Norris,
20 N. J. Eq. 489 (1869), where the court thought that an agreement to
release a special power for the benefit of the donee might be fraudulent.
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decisions are not numerous, it seems clear that the donee of
an imperative power cannot terminate it by his own act.14 In
Weller v. Ker,15 trustees were directed to hold the testator's
estate to the use of his son Robert and the heirs of his body,
but the estate was not to be conveyed to the son until he at-
tained the age of twenty-five; and in case the son should marry
or otherwise conduct himself so as not to merit the approbation
of the trustees, the provision in his favor should only belong to
him in life rent, and to his issue or heirs in fee. The son mar-
ried before attaining the age of twenty-five; and on the occasion
of the marriage, a settlement was drawn up which purported
to settle the estate on the husband as if he had the fee absolutely.
The trustees expressed their approval of the marriage, and seem
to have also impliedly approved of the settlement. After the
marriage, and before the son reached the age of twenty-five, he
conducted himself so as to merit the disapproval of the trustees,
and they entered a formal memorandum in their minute book
to that effect. The son having thereafter reached the age of
twenty-five, this action was brought by the trustees to obtain
the direction of the court as to their duties. The court declared
that, since the power was coupled with a duty, it could not be
released prior to the son's attaining the age of twenty-five. As
Lord Chelmsford observed, in his opinion in the case:
"It appears to me that the trustees could not either abandon or
fetter the exercise of the power intrusted to them. It was a
power coupled with a duty of a most important character."
The case of In re Somes 16 also involved an application of
trustees for direction of the court as to the distribution of a
trust estate. The husband, S. F. Somes, by a marriage settle-
ment, under which he had an equitable life interest and a power
to appoint by deed or will to the children or remoter issue of
the marriage, appointed the entire estate on trust for the ben-
efit of his daughter and her issue as he might appoint, and in
default of appointment, to the daughter. The father, then, by
a deed poll, released the trust fund from the latter power. The
question was whether this release was valid. The court was of
the opinion that it was, by reason of the fact that, though it
was a special power to appoint to a class, it was not a power
in trust. Mr. Justice Chitty said:
"Two cases . .17 were cited and relied on to show that
a trust coupled with a duty, or a power in the nature of a trust,
cannot be released. But these were both cases of trustees who
14See FARwELL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 13, 14; RoOD, op. cit. supra note
1, § 759c.
15 L. R. 1 Scotch & D. 11 (1866).
16 Supra note 12.
' 7 Re Eyre, 49 L. T. 259 (1883); Saul v. Pattinson, 34 W'kly Rep. 561
(1886).
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had a power coupled with a duty-a fiduciary power in the full
sense of the term; and it was held that neither before nor after
the Conveyancing Act, 1881, s. 52, were trustees capable of get-
ting rid of or releasing that part of their trust."
In Re Dunne's Trusts,s a power which the court regarded
as purely collateral was involved. The residue of the testator's
estate was left in trust for his children in certain proportions,
and it was provided that the share of his son Michael was sub-
ject to a power in the testator's wife, at her uncontrolled dis-
cretion, by deed or will, to declare that the son should not take
more than £1,000. The mother executed an instrument releas-
ing the power; and the question before the court was whether
the trustees were bound to turn over to the son more than £1,000.
The court held that they were not, and that the power had not
been released. While the court urged that this was a power
purely collateral, and therefore not releasable, its decision ap-
pears to be based primarily on the fact that the power was
coupled with a duty,19 Weller v. Ker being quoted with approval.
In the United States, the courts appear not to have considered
to any extent the question of the release of powers in trust,
though dicta that such powers cannot be extinguished are not
uncommon. For example, in Atkinson v. Dowlizg,20 which in-
volved a decision that a special power in gross could be released,
the court said, in speaking of the power in question:
"Such a power can, unquestionably, as a' general rule, be re-
leased or extinguished by the act of the donee. 1 Sugd. Powers,
73. But where such a power is coupled with a trust we suppose
it would be otherwise. Thus where an estate for life is given by
will to one with power to appoint the remainder, after the ter-ination of his life estate, among the children, and there is no
limitation over upon the failure to exercise the power, there a
trust will be implied in favor of the children, and the court will
make the appointment among the children equally. But where
there is a limitation over, upon the failure to exercise the power,
no such trust can be implied, for the reason that it would de-
feat the intention of the testator."
Second, all beneficial powers may be extinguished. This propo-
sition is generally accepted as law.21 It is true, first, because the
is L. R. 1 Ir. 516 (1878).
19 The question may be asked: How could this be a power in trust if
the donee had an uncontrolled discretion? It is believed that the answer
is that there was a duty on the part of the donee to exercise the power
under certain conditions,--namely if the son were undeserving; and that,
while this duty was not directly enforceable by a court, it would be in-
directly recognized, and would make the relation a power in trust.
20 Supra note 4, at 423, 12 S. E. at 95.
21 The following American cases sustain the extinguishment of bkn~ficial
powers: McFall v. Kirkpatrick, 236 IM. 281, 86 N. E. 139 (1908); Gros-
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donee does not owe any duty to anyone with respect to the power;
it is intended for his benefit, and he is not a fiduciary. Second,
it is true because extinguishment would have no more effect
than an appointment to the donee himself plus an alienation to
the person holding the property in default of appointment. This
rule is said to apply to beneficial powers purely collateral, and,
without doubt, courts would so hold, though there is little direct
authority to that effect.2 2 A question has sometimes been raised
as to whether a beneficial power to appoint by will could be
extinguished by deed, since to do so would in a sense defeat
the donor's intentions.2 3 But the American authorities sustain
such an extinguishment.
2 4
In Thorington v. Thorington,2 5 the testator devised land to
his wife for life, remainder to her three sons, with power in
his wife to dispose of said property by will to the three sons
or the survivors as she saw fit. She and the three sons filed a
bill in equity for a partition or sale in lieu thereof, A sale was
decreed. It was held that this was a power in gross, and that
such a power to appoint by will might be released or ex-
tinguished.
In Atkinson v. Dowling,2 6 the testator devised one-fourth of his
property to his wife for life, with power to appoint by will or
other writing upon her death among the children and grand-
children of the testator, and in default of appointment, then the
personal estate was to go to all the children, and the realty to
the three sons. The wife, desiring to sell a tract of land covered
by the power, drew up a writing appointing it to the testator's
son Jabez, and this son then joined with her in a conveyance to a
venor v. Bowen, 15 R. 1. 549, 10 At. 589 (1887); Hume v. Hord, 5 Gratt.
374 (Va. 1849); White v. Roberts, 145 Md. 405, 125 Atl. 733 (1924);
Johnson v. Harris, 202 Ky. 193, 259 S. W. 35 (1924); Tillett v. Nixon, 180
N. C. 195, 104 S. E. 352 (1920); Langley v. Conlan, 212 Mass. 135, 98
N. E. 1064 (1912).
22 Grange v. Tiving, 0. Bridg. 107 (1665), was a case of the execution of
a general power purely collateral, but the court discussed at length the
question whether such a power could be extinguished, and concluded that
such was possible. Bird v. Christopher, Sty. 389 (1653), supports the
proposition, the full report of the case being as follows: "In this case
upon giving of an evidence in a trespass and ejectment, it was said by
Roll, Chief Justice, that if I do enfeoff I. S.'with a proviso contained in the
deed, that it shall be lawful for me to revoke this feoffment, and afterwards
I levy a fine to 1. S. of the same land, this is an extinguishment of the
proviso of revocation.'
See also SUGDEN, op. cit. supra note 10, at 47.
23 Gray, op. cit. supra note 3, at 523531; KALEs, loc. cit. supra note 8.
4 White v. Roberts, supra note 21; Brown v. Renshaw, 57 Md. 67 (1881);
Johnson v. Harris, supra note 21; Grosvenor v. Bowen, supra note 21.
Contra: Learned v. Tallmadge, 26 Barb. 443 (N. Y. 1856).
2582 Ala. 489, 1 So. 716 (1887).
2 6Supra note 4.
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third party. At her death, the wife appointed to her daughters
any property over which she might have a power. It was held
that this being a power in gross and not a power in trust, the
wife could and did release it as to the lot in question.
In Columbia Trust Co. v. Christopher,- the testator devised
one-half the residue of his estate in trust for his mother for
life, and then for his wife for life, with power in the wife to
appoint the property in her lifetime or at her death to a char-
itable institution; in default of appointment, to the Y. LI. C. A.
and the Presbyterian Church. The wife, mother, Y. MI. C. A.,
and Presbyterian Church joined with the trustee in a conveyance
of land subject to the power. The case arises on the question of
whether or not the grantee in this conveyance can make good
title. The court held that his title was good and that the wife's
power was extinguished by her conveyance.
In Baker v. Wilert,-8 the testator devised land to his daugh-
ter for life, remainder to her lineal descendants surviving, and
in default of such descendants, remainder to the testator's lineal
descendants living at the daughter's death. The testator's heirs
were the daughter and three other children. They conveyed to
one S, and S conveyed to the daughter. She reconveyed to S,
covenanting not to exercise the power. Subsequently the four
children became seized as tenants in common and filed their bill
for partition. The court decreed a partition and held the power
was extinguished. "Powers in gross," said the court, "if not
coupled with a trust may be released to any person having an
estate of freehold in the land."
This was followed by two more Illinois cases, Biwer v. Mar-
tin,29 and Hill v. Sangamon Loan & Trust Co.,3  each involving
special powers in gross. Both held, following Baker v. Wilnert,
that the powers were extinguishable. There is a strong dictum
against the release of special powers in gross in Thomson's Ex'rs
v. Norris,3' and the dissenting opinion in MeFall v. Kirk-
patrick - is against allowing the extinguishment of a general
power in gross to appoint by will.
When we come to special powers purely collateral, it must be
conceded that the dicta are overwhelmingly against their release.
Professor Gray dismissed the whole subject by saying: 3
27133 Ky. 335, 117 S. W. 943 (1909).
2S Supra note 13.
29 294 Ill. 488, 128 N. E. 518 (1920).
30 Supra note 4.
31 Supra note 13, at 525. But see the decision in the court below, favor-
ing the release of such a power. 19 N. J. Eq. 307 (1868).
3 Supra note 21.
33 Gray, op. cit. supra note 3, at 516.
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"Such powers, if special, cannot be released. This has been
held semper, ubique, et ab omnibus."
But, so far as the writer has been able to find, no case has
ever held that a special power purely collateral (not a power
in trust) may not be extinguished.34 In support of the statement
just quoted, Professor Gray's only citation is Sugden, Powers
(8th ed. 1861) 49. On that page, Lord St. Leonards makes
the statement that the donee of a power simply collateral "can-
not by any act whatever suspend or extinguish his power." The
only cases he cites in support of the proposition are the follow-
ing: an anonymous Year Book case in the fifteenth year of
Henry VII; 35 Digges' Case; 3r Albany's Case;3 Grange v. Tiv-
ing;31 Tippet v. Eyres; 39 and Quick v. Ludborrow. 40
In the Year Book case referred to (which is perhaps cited
for the proposition under consideration more often than any
other) a man made a feoffment to trustees to the use of his will,
and afterward made his will directing the feoffees to give to his
wife a life estate and the remainder to his son and the heirs of
his body; but if the son died without heirs of his body, then the
feoffees were to alienate the land and distribute the price for
the testator's soul. The testator having died, his wife and son
also died, the latter leaving no heir. It appeared that the feoff-
ees had enfeoffed others to perform the uses of the testator's
will, and the question was whether the second feoffees could
make a valid sale. The court thought that the second feoffees
could not alienate and that the power still remained with the
first feoffees. That conclusion seems unobjectionable, not, how-
ever, for the reason that the first feoffees could not extinguish
the power, but because the power was limited to the first feoff-
ees and could not be transferred.
There are some observations of the court which pertain more
directly to the question of the release of purely collateral powers.
Fineux, C. J., said: 41
"There is a diversity where the power given to the feoffees
is annexed to the land and where it is not; for if the will be,
that the aforesaid feoffees shall make an estate over to a cer-
34 In re Dunne's Trusts might possibly be thought to be such a case, but
it is believed to have involved a power in trust, and such was the view of
the court. See supra note 19.
35 (1500) Y. B. 15 Hen. VII, f. lib, translated in SUGDEN, op. cit. supra
note 10, at 893.
861 Co. 178a (1598).
371 Co. 107a (1586).
38 Supra note 22.
s95 Mod. 457 (1689).
40 3 Bulst. 29 (1581).
1 See the translation in SUGDEN, op. ci. supra note 10, at 894.
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tain person for certain years, there, if they make feoffment
over to the same use, the first feoffors cannot do that, for that
power is a thing annexed to the land, which no one can do but
he who has the land. But here the will was that the aforesaid
feoffees shall alien the land, etc., and that may well be done after
the feoffment made by themselves to the use; and therefore their
power is not determined by their feoffment. . . . And if a
man has feoffees upon confidence, and makes a will that his exe-
cutors shall alien his lands, there, if the executors renounce
administration of the goods, yet they may alien the land, for the
will of land is not a testamentary matter, nor have the executors
to interfere in this will, except so far as a special power is
given to them."
It will be seen that these remarks of Fineux are not in any
way inconsistent with the proposition herein urged,-first, be-
cause he is discussing disclaimer of the office and not release
of the power; and second, because, as we have seen, the power
of an executor to sell is always a power in trust, and thus
would not be extinguished in any event. The case contains no
generalizations as to the release of powers purely collateral.
Albany's Case involved a general power in gross which the
court held could be extinguished. Yet the court observes, citing
the Year Book case just referred to, that
"an authority or power which is collateral to the right and
title of the land, cannot be given or extinguished by fine or
feoffment; neither can he thereby disable himself to make an
estate according to his authority and power when it comes in
esse."
Digges' Case was likewise a case of a general power of re-
vocation in gross. The usual dicta as to powers purely collateral,
with the citation of the same Year Book case, appear.
Grnnge v. Tiving was a case involving the execution of a gen-
eral power purely collateral by an infant feme covct, the
court holding the execution good.
Tippet v. Eyres was an action of debt on a bond for the per-
formance of an award of an arbitrator, and the question was
whether, when one umpire had been chosen and refused to act,
and then a second umpire was chosen and did act, his award
was good. The court held it was, and some observations were
made about bare powers and authorities which had nothing to
do with the case at bar.
Quick v. Ludborrow was an action of covenant which involved
a promise to pay money to a stranger to the covenant, and the
question was whether the stranger could release. Some obser-
vations were made which might be applicable to the release of
a purely collateral power, but nothing of the sort was involved
in the case.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
The only additional cases cited by Mr. Farwell 42 in connection
with the usual statement about the impossibility' of extinguishing
purely collateral powers are West v. Berney,43 which involved a
power in gross, and Willis v. Shorral,44 which involved an at-
tempt by the owner of an estate in the land, who was not the
donee of the power, to extinguish it by fine.
Mr. Tiffany, in the second edition of his textbook on Real
Property,45 cites Digges' Case and Grange v. Tiving, to both of
which reference has already been made, and a dictum in Edwards
v. Sleator 46 (which was a case involving the power of a life
tenant to make a lease for years).
These being substantially the only authorities in support of
the proposition, it would seem still to be an undecided question
whether a special power purely collateral and not in trust can be
extinguished. The strongest argument in favor of the proposi-
tion that such a power cannot be terminated by the donee would
appear to be found in the large number of unsupported asser-
tions that such is the law.
47
On the other hand, it should be noted that, as has been seen
in Part I of this paper, powers of sale of executors were recog-
nized as powers in trust; and in all probability the power of
sale of an executor was one of the earliest types of power
purely collateral. Hence it might have been natural to assume
that all powers purely collateral are powers in trust.
Furthermore, we find the notion vaguely expressed in some
of the earlier cases that the donee of a power purely collateral
has nothing he can release for he has no interest in the property.
As Dodderidge, J., said in Quick v. Ludborrow," "a release doth
not operate, but upon an estate, interest, or right." One may
surmise that these early judges were unable to conceive of a
power cutting down the sum total of legal relations which make
up ownership in fee, and that therefore the donee simply had
nothing to give up; or, if the donee had a power in trust, that
he had a duty, which, of course, could not be released.41
42 FARWELL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 12.
43 Supra note 6.
44 1Atk. 474 (1738).
-1 1 T1FFANY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1103, nn. 47, 48.
4 6Supra note 5.
4 See Co. Lrrr. *237a and *265b, for his statement of the law.
48 Supra note 39, at 30.
4 There is also another explanation which is given in some of the early
cases, namely, that the donee of a power purely collateral could not ex-
tinguish because, in the case of a power of sale, the vendee is in by the
devisor and not the donee. As Mr. Chance pointed out, that is unsound,
since many powers are extinguishable where the appointee would derive his
title from the donor. 2 CHANcE, PowERs (1841) 580. Nevertheless, in 1
SANDERS, USES AND TRusTs (5th ed. 1844), 183, the old notion is again
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It is quite possible that one reason why no case has arisen on
the release of purely collateral special powers not in trust may
be because purely collateral powers generally are in trust. But
clearly one could conceive of such a power which would not be
in trust. Suppose A devises to B in fee with power to C to
appoint the property to anyone he may choose except that his
choice is to be limited to the blood relations of A. Following
the decision of In "re Combe, ° we would conclude that this power
is not imperative, and, if not imperative, it is not a power in
trust. It would seem that there is no good reason of policy for
denying the donee of such a power the power to extinguish it.
While the view herein expressed is contrary to the great mass
of dicta, some support for it in the textbooks may be found. Mr.
Chance, in his work on powers, after pointing out that there
are no positive decisions on the point, discusses various cases
and continues: 51
"Powers given to executors, and other powers of that descrip-
tion in the nature of trusts, may in general stand on a different
footing. The donees of such powers have been resembled to
common attorneys under letters of attorney. . . . In such
cases the courts may well hold that the donees would be violating
their duty in attempting to prevent the execution of their pow-
ers. Perhaps it may be doubted whether the doctrine would be
carried further; if so, Popham's position in Digges' Case may
be considered of a questionable nature."
Farther on 52, he says:
"It may be thought, that the only satisfactory ground on vhich
the doctrine as to the non-extinguishment of certain powers
rests, is, that it is or may be the duty of the donee to execute
them, and consequently a breach of his duty to extinguish
them. . "
It would appear also that Mr. Joshua Williams was of the
same opinion, for in his well known textbook on Real Property
he says: 53
"Powers& may, generally speaking, be destroyed or ex-
tinguished by deed of release made by the donee or owner of
the power to any person having an estate of freehold in the land;
'for it would be strange and unreasonable that a thing, which is
created by act of the parties, should not by their act, with their
mutual consent be dissolved again.' . . . The exceptions to
advanced that a power purely collateral cannot be extinguished because
"the person to be benefited under the exercise of the power does not claim
the estate from or under the donee, but under the original settlor."
Zo [1925] Ch. 210.
5-2 CHANCE, op. cit. supra note 49, at 582.
52 Ibid. 584.
5 3 WUZr=s, REAL PROPERTY (24th ed. 1926) 474.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
this rule appear to be all reducible to the simple principle that,
if the duty of the donee of the power may require him to exer-
cise it at any future time, then he cannot extinguish it by re-
lease." 54
There is also .an observation by way of dictum, in the case
of Jackson v. Davenport,55 which is favorable to the view herein
expressed. In that case the Chancellor said:
"It is stated in the books as a general rule that a simply col-
lateral or naked power cannot be barred or extinguished by
disseisin, or by fine, feoffment or other conveyance. . . . It
is said, for instance, that if a power to sell land be given to
executors, and the heir of the testator enters and enfeoffs B, who
dies seised, yet the executors may sell, and the vendee will be
in by the will, which is paramount to the descent, and that a
descent which tolls an entry does not toll a power. . . . I pre-
sume, that I may venture, upon the strength of the authorities
which have been previously mentioned, and upon the reason of
the thing, to question the universality of the application of this
rule, and to insist that it ought to be confined within reasonable
limits."
The limits, however, which the Chancellor then indicated are
not particularly pertinent to this discussion.
By what methods may the donee terminate the power? First,
he may execute a release to the persons whose interests in the
property would be affected by an appointment.," Second, if
the power be appendant, a conveyance of the property operates,
by way of estoppel, to extinguish the power in so far as its exer-
cise would affect the property conveyed. 7  This is because the
donee will not be permitted to derogate from his own grant.
Third, the donee, if he does not have the property which is sub-
ject to the power, may acquire it; and thereafter a conveyance
by him of the property in question will terminate the power as
to the property conveyed, as if the power had been originally
appendant.58
In a few cases it seems to be the view of the courts that,
when the donee of a power in gross acquires the other interests
in the property, the power is destroyed by being merged in the
54 That these remarks do not refer to the English legislation of 1881
which made special powers, purely collateral, releasable, is seen from the
fact that this statement appeared as early as the 4th edition of Mr. Wil-
liams' text, which was published in 1871.
55 20 Johns. 537, 552 (N. Y. 1822).
56 In Grosvenor v. Bowen, supra note 21, such a mode of release was
held valid.
57 This was the mode of extinguishment in McFall v. Kirkpatrick, supra
note 21, and in Langley v. Conlan, supra note 21.
58 Such a method of extinguishment was recognized in Baker v. Wilmerb,
supra note 13.
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fee. ' That certainly, if law, seems inconsistent with the English
rule that a power and the fee may exist separately in the same
person.6 Whether most American courts would recognize the
existence of a power separate from the fee in the same peison
may well be doubted. However, so far as common law systems
of power are concerned, it is not necessary to the decision in
any of the American cases on extinguishment of powers to hold
that they were destroyed by a merger of the power with the
fee.61 Hence, the question may be regarded as still an open one.
In conclusion, be it said that the position herein presented that
all powers are terminable by the donee except powers in trust
is not a purely technical one. A power may well be a serious
clog on the alienability of property. The tendency of land law
seems to be in the direction of a greater degree of alienability.
That the tendency toward furthering the extinguishment of
powers is very real is shown by the fact that in England, where
powers are used far more than in America, since 1882, statutory
provisions have permitted the release of all powers except pow-
ers in trust.
62
The view that special powers in gross are not releasable has
not been accepted by the American courts. Hence, we would
have a most irrational distinction between powers purely collat-
eral and other powers, if we were to follow the usual dictum as
to the release of the former. To place the exception to the re-
leasibility of powers on the basis of a fiduciary duty in the donee
of a power in trust is to put the conclusions of the courts on a
rational basis, and at the same time to impose no undue restric-
tion on free alienability. While the proposition contended for,
-namely, that all powers are terminable except powers in trust,
-- cannot be said to be settled law, because of the small number
of decided cases, yet it appears to be in accord with the spirit
and tendency, as well as the actual ratio decidendi, of the Amer-
ican cases.
s' That idea is expressed in Tillet v. Nixon, supra note 21, and Baker
v. Wilmert, s.pra note 13. In both cases, however, it is possible to explain
the extinguishment by an alienation after the power became appendant
Spencer v. Kimball, 98 MAe. 499, 57 Atl. 793 (1904), contains a dictum that
a power of sale would be extinguished by a merger.
In New York, where the common law of powers is not in force, it seems
that a power may merge in the fee. Jennings v. Conboy, 73 N. Y. 2'30
(1878).
0o Clere's Case, 6 Co. 17b (1599); SUGDEN, op. Cit. supra note 10, at 93
et. seq.
61 See supra note 59.
62 CON-EYANCING AcT, (1881) 44 & 45 Vict. c. 41, § 52. This provision
has been retained in the new LAW OF POPERTY ACT, (1925) 15 Geo. V, c.
20, § 155; TOPHAM, NEW LAW OF PRoPERrY (2d ed. 1925) 203.
